South China Sea Dispute: Chinese Dream or Total Nightmare?

On 16 November 2021, Chinese coastguard ships intercepted and fired water cannons at Philippine vessels on a supply mission to military personnel stationed on the Ayungin Shoal in the disputed South China Sea (SCS). Philippine Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin subsequently decried the acts as “illegal”, stating that “China has no law enforcement rights in and around these areas” (Al Jazeera 2021). This exchange marks the latest in a decades-long series of incidents between China and other claimants of the SCS. China’s vision of the SCS is one which claims nearly its entirety under a “nine-dashed-line”, which includes waters within the internationally accepted Exclusive Economic Zones of several ASEAN member states. As China’s influence rises in Southeast Asia, it has attempted to use its leverage to obtain concessions from the regional bloc and its members regarding the maritime dispute. These attempts include incremental assertiveness via maturing military and maritime capabilities, and the harnessing of the combined limitations of the ASEAN Way and some states’ economic dependency on itself to produce favourable outcomes. Conversely, hindrances to China’s strategy have also been apparent, namely that: ASEAN member states remain steadfast to their individual national security priorities, with or without the backing of ASEAN; China’s perceived coerciveness has unified some member states in their resolve for a rules-based solution; and finally, ASEAN’s increasing importance to China’s geopolitical strategy becoming a countervailing factor. This essay will thus posit that, while China has indeed achieved some success in levying its vision of the SCS on ASEAN, prevailing political realities still prevent it from attaining its final goal.

The SCS Dispute: A Brief Introduction

Before discussing China’s activities in the SCS vis-à-vis its neighbours, it is necessary to enumerate, briefly, on the dispute itself. Involving both maritime and island claims in the region, it concerns China and the aforementioned ASEAN member states, as well as the Republic of China (Taiwan). Features of the SCS which have been claimed by the parties involved include Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands, although most are principally interested in the concomitant acquisition of fishing rights, and the potential exploitation of oil and gas reserves (Nguyen 2015). Also given that by 2016, a third of global shipping passed through the SCS — including over 64% of China’s maritime trade — it is evident that the control of these waters holds substantial strategic and security significance (CSIS 2017).

China’s Vision of the SCS

Beyond the stated economic and security priorities, China’s vision of the SCS should be considered within the context of broader national identity building. The country’s territorial assertions are arguably in keeping with President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” (Zhongguo meng), the objective of which is the eventual restoration of China to its perceived past glory in an East Asian, Sino-centric order (Berkofsky 2016: 111). The association with national history was demonstrated in 2000, when China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs used ancient Chinese texts to assert that “China was the first to discover, name, develop, conduct economic activities on and exercise jurisdiction of the Nansha [Spratly] Islands” (FMPRC 2000). In 2014, the Chinese Government released a position paper which similarly maintained that China had been the first to exercise its sovereignty over the SCS islands, with its activity in the area dating back “over 2,000 years ago” (FMPRC 2014). With Beijing also declaring a “core interest” in the SCS (Yoshihara and Holmes 2011), these illustrate the seemingly inextricable link that has been woven between China’s identity narrative and the maritime features of the SCS, as in the case of Taiwan. In sum, the nine-dashed line is thus seen by China as the maintenance of longstanding and inviolable sovereignty, with strategic implications for its related interaction with other claimants.

Attainment by Accrued Force

China has been able to impose a degree of its SCS vision via the gradual maturation of its military and maritime capabilities. International media coverage has mostly focused on the SCS dispute in tandem with China’s rising star over the last two decades. Expanding the period of assessment highlights that Beijing’s current hard power capability to press its claims is likely the fruition of much earlier policy decisions. For example, after the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, Chinese surveys of the marine life, energy resources, and hydrological conditions across the SCS were launched. By 1998, Beijing had established a foothold in the Spratly Islands, and further formed the China Marine Surveillance, an agency with the mandate to enforce China’s claimed maritime jurisdiction. Combined with the necessary training and equipment, the CMS was subsequently able to mount regular patrols across the expansive area denoted by the nine-dash line. In 2012, the presence of CMS patrols allowed China to swiftly respond to the attempted apprehension of eight Chinese fishing vessels near Scarborough Shoal by the Philippine Navy, underscoring its commitment and ability to enforce its claims (Chubb 2021). Whilst the CMS has since been reorganised into the China Coast Guard, the evolution of Beijing’s maritime stratagems has continued via its People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Paralleling the growth of the CMS’s capabilities, PAFMM has expanded in size and scope since China seized de facto control of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in the 1970s, now numbering an estimated 300 vessels. In recent years, the militia has been accused of engaging in various dangerous acts, which have been perceived as attempts to intimidate or impair foreign vessels (Hale 2021). Part of China’s “grey-zone” tactics, the militia has facilitated aggressive expansion in the SCS, avoiding the implications of traditional warfare while retaining a degree of deniability when confronted with international law (Holmes and Yoshihara 2017). The observed long-term evolution of China’s military/maritime competencies and engagement tactics has thus markedly enabled it to increase its assertiveness in the SCS.

Harnessing the Limitations of the ASEAN Way

China’s ability to gradually impose its desires regarding the SCS is arguably assisted by inherent limitations in ASEAN’s engagement methodology, which hinder the bloc’s cohesiveness vis-à-vis Beijing. The bloc’s central pillar is the ‘ASEAN Way’, which aims to establish a framework of regional cooperation and inter-state relations that avoids formal mechanisms in favour of a loose system of consultation and consensus, with an emphasis on non-interference (Severino 2015). Whilst regional leaders contend that this has allowed for more amiable relations within Southeast Asia, criticism has increasingly been levied at the ASEAN Way’s suitability when addressing external issues. Mazza and Schmitt (2011) highlight that the ASEAN Way was formulated in the Cold War context of a relatively weak China, a declining Soviet Union, and a United States that took a “light-handed approach” to the region. In view of changing geopolitics, Pek (2014) conjectures that the ASEAN Way seems now “poorly equipped to handle Chinese assertive divide-and-rule diplomacy”. An oft-stated reflection of this assertion is the unprecedented failure of ASEAN foreign ministers to release a joint statement in 2012, following a summit that had the SCS dispute on the agenda. The Philippines and Vietnam had pressed for ASEAN to state its refusal of Beijing’s desire for the SCS dispute to be handled at a purely bilateral level. Contrastingly, Cambodia was accused by the Philippines of blocking mention of the dispute, with its foreign minister insisting that “the meeting…is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute” (BBC News 2012). This veto was attributed to Phnom Penh’s close relationship with Beijing, both having established significant economic and military ties. In 2016, ASEAN’s fragmentation on the SCS dispute appeared to deepen when ASEAN withdrew an initially “strongly-worded statement” due to alleged “urgent amendments”, but later failed for a second time in the bloc’s history to issue a final joint statement (Latiff 2016). As China’s influence becomes more intertwined with the interests of ASEAN’s members through its extensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, opportunities for conflicts of interest between member states may proportionally increase. This would inhibit the formulation of a united stance, effectively allowing for the expansion of China’s activities in the SCS and poignantly impacting the bloc’s key aspiration for members to lead their existence “free from external interference” (ASEAN 2008: 6).

ASEAN: National Security Remains Paramount

However, although ASEAN’s loose cooperative mechanisms may appear to weaken its response to China, it is paradoxically this same feature that has granted each member state the freedom to respond in its own way, multiplying the diplomatic conundrums faced by China. While lacking the unified backing of the bloc, individual member states have held fast and, in some cases, acted decisively to protect their claims of sovereignty. This has been partially enabled by the state of ASEAN unity — member states have tried to enhance cooperation, but they have yet to entrust the defence of their individual sovereignties to a supranational entity. In the areas of security and foreign policy, each member state has thus continued to act according to self-interest, occasionally unbound by its commitments to ASEAN. A demonstrable instance is the cited case of ASEAN’s failure to issue a final joint statement in 2016. In lieu of an updated joint statement, it was announced that each country would be making individual statements instead. Indonesia and Singapore adopted a conciliatory tone, calling on China and ASEAN to “continue working together to maintain the peace and stability” of the SCS (Buendia 2020). By contrast, as a claimant state, Vietnam’s foreign ministry emphasised its disquiet regarding the build-up of military assets in the SCS, “especially the large-scale accretion and embellishment and construction of the reefs, the militarization of the artificial islands and actions of sovereignty claims that are not based on international law” (Latiff 2016). The Philippines arguably diverged furthest from ASEAN in acting to safeguard its interests. Without prior consultation with fellow ASEAN members or utilisation of conventional ASEAN mechanisms, the country had instead filed a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to obtain a ruling on its legal entitlements under UNCLOS (Buendia 2016). The persistence of both Vietnam and the Philippines, notably with the backing of the United States (Hansler and Lendon 2021), appear thus to complicate China’s attempts to mitigate opposition to its SCS expansion. As each side hews to fundamentally incompatible notions of territorial boundaries and maritime law, Beijing may yet find it difficult to achieve full and lasting acceptance of its territorial claims.

ASEAN: Nominal Unity for a Rules-Based Order

China’s growing belligerence in the SCS has also served, perhaps inadvertently, to unite some ASEAN members within the nominally common cause of maintaining a rules-based order. Whilst Chang (2021) notes that Southeast Asian cooperation over the SCS has waned opposite China’s burgeoning economic influence, the frequency of Chinese belligerence has still been received with concern, given the reliance ASEAN’s smaller states have on the rules-based international order. Thus, while some ASEAN states have tuned their foreign policies to reduce conflict with Beijing, an overarching narrative has arguably emerged amongst some ASEAN countries. Most recently during the 2020 ASEAN Summit, then-chair Vietnam highlighted “acts in violation of international law…affecting the environment of security and stability”. Philippine President Duterte further referenced “alarming” incidents in the SCS, calling for adherence to international law. Indonesian President Joko Widodo further sought for ASEAN to be the “guardian of our own region [and] not the projection of power by bigger nations” (Anjaiah 2020). In the 2021 ASEAN-China Special Summit and 39th ASEAN Summit respectively, the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Cambodia also underscored the urgent need for a Code of Conduct (CoC) that is in line with international law, including UNCLOS (Tay 2021; Khmer Times 2021). Although varying in tone, it may be evinced that several ASEAN leaders have, to some degree, coalesced around the need for clear rules of engagement vis-à-vis the asymmetric strategies employed by Beijing. Le (2021: 10–11) consequently argues that ASEAN’s consistency on this issue was instrumental in ultimately compelling China’s involvement in CoC talks, via a multilateral approach that it had initially been opposed to. As such, whereas the engagement of China in CoC talks does not imply resolution of the dispute, it should be noted as a significant concession from Beijing to assuage ASEAN’s stated concerns.

China: Adjusting Priorities Amidst a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

Aside from the bloc’s consistent diplomatic pressure, its rising status as a geopolitical and economic lynchpin may have also led to Beijing’s adoption of a more conciliatory deportment. In 2020, ASEAN eclipsed the European Union (EU) as China’s largest trading partner, with trade exceeding USD 732 billion in value (Global Times 2021). Regardless of whether individual ASEAN members have cultivated economic dependencies on China, it is evident that Chinese investment has proliferated across the bloc, raising its value to Beijing, and underscoring the ever-larger consequences to Chinese investors in the event of diplomatic fallout. ASEAN’s apparent value within China’s broader geopolitical strategy can also be observed from Beijing’s frequent diplomatic overtures. In the recent 2021 ASEAN-China Special Summit, China pledged to upgrade relations with ASEAN, notably elevating it to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” which entails future strengthening of security cooperation. President Xi also declared that China would contribute funds for the region’s pandemic control and post-COVID recovery, as well as facilitate freer trade and more technology transfers. Tied to these promises was an insistence that China was resolutely opposed to “hegemonism and power politics”, and that it “will not bully smaller countries” (Ng and Zhou 2021). China’s diplomatic shift marks Beijing’s concern regarding intensifying US and EU involvement in the broader Asia-Pacific, with the US already providing military support to some ASEAN SCS claimants and the EU aiming to increase its naval presence via freedom of navigation exercises and port calls (Pejsova 2019). In balancing the fulfilment of its vision for the SCS and concern about the mounting interference of external parties within its geographical backyard, alongside economic realities, China may thus have concluded that the latter two concerns merit softening its strategy in the former through such means as the CoC talks and multilateralism.

China has continually endeavoured to impose its vision of the SCS on its ASEAN neighbours, whether through diplomatic or more coercive means. As the largest claimant, it has been able to bring its equally substantial economic and hard power to bear in the dispute (Le 2021: 15–16). Despite attaining some success as a result, ASEAN’s growing importance to Beijing has also produced observable concessions at the regional bloc’s insistence. These include China’s participation in the CoC negotiations and reluctant acceptance of ASEAN’s organisational role in seeking a multilateral solution to the dispute. Other political realities further complicate the fulfilment of Beijing’s vision, given that ASEAN disputants have yet to relinquish their claims, and have garnered the support of the US and EU as part of a broader call for a rules-based order in the SCS. As the SCS dispute continues to evolve as part of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific, China may be obliged to postpone or amend its stated vision for the SCS, to ensure it does not lose goodwill amongst its regional partners.

Joshua is in his third year of International Relations with French at UNM, and an ASEAN Research Consultant for a Swiss fintech firm. In his free time, he enjoys pestering the editor of this article with Instagram posts of horrendous little memes.

Editor’s note: This article was submitted as an assignment to the University of Nottingham Malaysia.

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of PHIR-Nott.

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